The next time you’re driving on the road in Michigan after having consumed alcoholic beverages, make sure you signal each time you change lanes. The Michigan Court of Appeals recently ruled that the Michigan statute, MCL 257.648, requires drivers to use a turn signal when changing lanes on a highway and is not unconstitutionally vague.

In People v. Hrlic, the defendant was stopped after a police officer observed her change lanes without using her turn signal. She was subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. She tried to supress the evidence gathered against her on the basis that the police stop was invalid. The defendant argued that the statute was unconsitutionaly vague and that she was not required to use her turn signal when changing lanes, but the court of appeals disagreed, noting the following in its opinion published on November 29, 2007:

MCL 257.648 states that, “before stopping or turning from a direct line, [the driver] shall first see that the stopping or turning can be made in safety and shall give a signal as required [.] Therefore, the purpose of the statute is to provide notice of movements along the route that could impact other motorists. We see no reason to make a distinction between movement off the roadway and movement between lanes when the legislative aim is the same for both situations. Accordingly, a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence is not required to speculate about the phrase’s meaning, and MCL 257.648 provides fair notice of what conduct is proscribed. We hold that MCL 257.648 requires drivers to use a turn signal when changing lanes on a highway and is not unconstitutionally vague.

Based on this ruling, the police may stop you for failure to signal when changing lanes in Michigan. That said, the next time you drive after consuming alcoholic beverages (which we do not condone, but happens), if you want to avoid being arrested for operating while intoxicated, then you will not want to give the police a valid reason to stop you, and this now includes signaling each time you change lanes.

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The GL Law Group, PLC provides free information on Michigan DUI law and guide to choosing a good Michigan DUI attorney. If you have recently been arrested for a DUI, it’s important to contact a good DUI lawyer soon. A guilty DUI conviction can ruin your life. Contact us to set up a free DUI case review.

On October 30, 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion in the case People v. Bach, affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the DUI defendant’s request to withdraw her guilty plea to a third offense of operating while intoxicated (OWI) with a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher under M.C.L. 257.625(1). The DUI defendant was sentenced to 23 to 60 months imprisonment.

The DUI defendant’s primary argument on appeal was that her first OWI conviction was obtained in violation of her right to counsel and, therefore, that first operating while intoxicated conviction could not be used to support her OWI third offense conviction. Specifically, the DUI defendant claimed that she was denied her request for a court appointed lawyer and her first OWI conviction eventually led to five days in prison. Consequently, she argued on appeal that the trial court erred for denying her request to withdraw her guilty plea.

The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed. “‘A collateral attack on a prior conviction underlying a present charge may not be made after a defendant’s plea of guilty to the present charge is accepted.’” Citing the Michigan Supreme Court case People v. Roseberry, the court of appeals noted that, “To be timely, such a motion must be made before a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted.”

Based on this rule, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. “In the case at bar, once the Lenawee transcript was filed in the circuit court, the trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea without any further discussion between the court and the parties. Therefore, even if we were to assume that defendant’s first OWI conviction was obtained in violation of her right to counsel, because defendant’s plea was accepted without defendant moving to set aside the prior conviction, defendant could no longer make a collateral attack regarding her prior underlying OWI conviction.”

The DUI defendant also raised on appeal an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, which the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected.

Click here to read the entire opinion.

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The GL Law Group, PLC provides free information on Michigan DUI law and guide to choosing a good Michigan DUI attorney. If you have recently been arrested for a DUI, it’s important to contact a good DUI lawyer soon. A guilty DUI conviction can ruin your life. Contact us to set up a free DUI case review.

On October 25, 2007, in an unpublished opinion in the case People v. Joslin, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the DUI defendant’s guilty conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI)  with an occupant under the age of 16, a violation of M.C.L. 257.625(7)(a)(ii). After the jury found the DUI defendant guilty, the trial court trial court sentenced him to 365 days in the county jail and one year of probation, with the requirement that he perform 300 hours of community service. The DUI defendant’s jail term was reduced to 226 days on request by the sheriff. On appeal, the DUI defendant argued that his Michigan DUI attorney was ineffective, which affected the results of his trial. The facts of the case are as follows:

According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, one late-night, “a witness observed a truck being driven erratically.  A public safety officer responding to the reported incident saw the truck do a U-turn, then park. The officer parked his patrol car, walked up to the truck, and saw defendant in the driver’s seat of the truck. The officer also saw defendant’s sixyear- old son sitting in the passenger seat. Because defendant smelled of alcohol, the officer performed field sobriety tests on him. Concluding that defendant was drunk, the officer placed him under arrest. A blood test later showed that defendant’s blood alcohol level was .12. The prosecutor charged defendant with resisting arrest and with OUIL with a juvenile passenger. At the first trial on these charges, the jury acquitted defendant of resisting arrest but deadlocked on the OUIL. The trial court held a second jury trial on this charge, resulting in the present conviction.”

The DUI defendant argued that his Michigan DUI lawyer was ineffective “for failing to object to testimony provided by two public safety officers describing defendant’s belligerent conduct after his arrest, including a callous remark defendant made about his son being placed in foster care.”  The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, noting that to convict the DUI defendant, “the prosecutor had to prove that defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a person under age 16 in the vehicle. MCL 257.625(1)(a), (7)(a).” According to the court, the evidence at issue was “relevant to the issue of the identity of the person actually driving the truck when it was observed swerving on the roadway, and to whether defendant was intoxicated.”

The court of appeals concluded that even if it were to assume that the DUI defendant’s lawyer had objected to the disputed evidence and that it would have been sustained by the court, the DUI defendant failed “to show that the trial result was unreliable, and that the result would have been different but for counsel’s failure to object.”

Click here to read the entire opinion.

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The GL Law Group, PLC provides free information on Michigan DUI law and guide to choosing a good Michigan DUI attorney. If you have recently been arrested for a DUI, it’s important to contact a good DUI lawyer soon. A guilty DUI conviction can ruin your life. Contact us to set up a free DUI case review.

On October 23, 2007, in the case People v. Middler, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the DUI defendant’s conviction of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor (OUIL) under M.C.L. 257.625(1) – her third offense – and of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, under M.C.L 257.904(3)(a). The DUI defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail with 44 days of credit, and 24 months’ probation.

On appeal, the DUI defendant argued that her convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of appeals disagreed. The court’s analysis first began with a review of the elements the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a DUI defendant of operating under the influence of liquor: “(1) that defendant was operating a motor vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public; (2) that while so driving he was under the influence of alcohol; and (3) that as a result of the drinking, defendant was substantially deprived of normal control or clarity of mind.”

First, the court noted that the DUI defendant and the prosecutor both stipulated to the fact that she was found to have an alcohol content of 0.16 grams per 210 liters of breath, which was twice the legal limit of .08. Consequently, the issue became a question of how the DUI defendant arrived at the home of her former boyfriend. If there was sufficient evidence to show that she drove herself there (meaning operating a vehicle on a public highway), she would be guilty of OUIL, whereas, on the other hand, if there was not sufficient evidence, then the DUI defendant could be found guilty.

The court explained that under the Michigan Vehicle Code, M.C.L. 257.35a, operate means “being in actual physical control of a vehicle regardless of whether or not the person is licensed under this act as an operator or chauffeur.” According to the Michigan Court of Appeals, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the DUI defendant operated a vehicle while under the influence of liquor:

“At trial, Officers Wakerly and Will both testified that defendant said she ‘took the back roads’ to get to Slocum’s on the night in question. Defendant never said or implied that someone else had driven her to Slocum’s, and there was no evidence indicating that anyone else had been present at the scene that night. Although defendant’s daughter, Brandi, testified that she drove defendant to Slocum’s residence and was then picked up by her then boyfriend in a separate vehicle, Officer Wakerly testified that the only tire tracks seen in the snow that night belonged to defendant’s truck, and there was only one set of foot prints seen in the snow, which also presumably belonged to defendant. Similarly, Officer Will testified that the only tire tracks she observed belonged to defendant’s truck and Officer Wakerly’s vehicle. Additionally, Brandi contradicted herself during the course of her testimony, such as when she initially stated that she collided with Slocum’s vehicle fairly hard upon arriving at the residence and then later said she did not really hit the vehicle very hard. The testimony of Officers Wakerly and Will, along with the appearance of the scene of the crime, cast doubt on the credibility of Brandi’s testimony.”

The court ruled that a rational jury could have found the DUI defendant’s testimony to not be credible based on the inconsistencies described above. As a result, the court found sufficient evidence to support the DUI defendant’s conviction of OUIL.

Click here to read the entire opinion.

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The GL Law Group, PLC provides free information on Michigan DUI law and guide to choosing a good Michigan DUI attorney. If you have recently been arrested for a DUI, it’s important to contact a good DUI lawyer soon. A guilty DUI conviction can ruin your life. Contact us to set up a free DUI case review.

On October 18, 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals released an unpublished opinion in the case People v. Swift, affirming the DUI defendant’s guilty conviction of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing death under M.C.L. 257.625(4). The DUI defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender to 142 to 270 months in prison.

The DUI defendant argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing death.

According to the court of appeals, the DUI defendant did not dispute that he was driving the automobile at issue or that the victim died from injuries suffered in the accident. Further, the court explained that it is not disputed that that marijuana and THC, its active ingredient, are controlled substances under M.C.L 333.7212(1)(d).

In this DUI case, experts testified on behalf of the prosecution that the DUI defendant’s level of THC was too high to have been the result of secondhand smoke, and that the DUI defendant likely consumed the marijuana within 12 hours of the accident. Consequently, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the DUI defendant knowingly consumed marijuana before the accident, and that a reasonable jury could have also determined from this evidence that the DUI defendant voluntarily decided to drive knowing that he might be impaired.

The only issue the appellate court had to review was whether the element of causation was satisfied, because under Michigan DUI law, to be convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing death, there must be evidence that the DUI defendant caused the death simply by his driving — whether his
driving was “impaired” is irrelevant to the analysis, the court noted. “For the purposes of . . . driving under the influence of a controlled
substance causing death, the defendant’s driving must be the factual cause of death.” As the court stated, “[a] defendant’s act is the factual cause of the accident and the death if ‘absent the defendant’s conduct’ the accident would not have occurred.”

The DUI defendant argued that he was not the factual cause of the accident, claiming that it was the accident victim’s act of “pulling out into the intersection when he had an obligation to wait at the stop sign until traffic had cleared” that was the factual cause of the accident.

But the court of appeals disagreed, stating that but for the DUI defendant’s driving, the accident would not have occurred. The court, however, did not end its analysis there. It next reviewed whether there was proximate cause, or as the court explained, whether “the fatal accident was the direct and natural result of defendant’s excessive speed and marijuana consumption.” According to the court, had the DUI defendant not been speeding or impaired by drugs, “he likely would have driven with ordinary care and would have had time to react to avoid the accident.”

The defendant argued, however, that there was an intervening, superseding cause breaking the causal chain between his conduct and the victim’s injury. “Defendant argues that the victim’s act of pulling out in front of him was an intervening cause that broke the causal link.” But again, the court disagreed. “[A]n act breaks the causal link and becomes a superseding cause only if the ‘act by the victim or third party was not reasonably foreseeable—e.g., gross negligence or intentional misconduct . . . .’”

“We conclude that the victim’s driving into the intersection may have been negligent, but it was not grossly negligent and was foreseeable based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Drivers pull out in front of other cars regularly. A reasonable driver is aware that a sudden stop to avoid an accident may be required, and adjusts his or her speed accordingly. Although defendant had the right of way, he did not have the right to be driving 30 miles per hour or more in excess of the posted speed limit after having consumed marijuana. It appears that the victim pulled out directly in front of defendant; however, the victim may well have believed that defendant was traveling at the posted speed limit and that there was accordingly sufficient time to do so safely. Indeed, testimony suggested that when a car is approaching another, it is often difficult to judge its speed. While the victim apparently misjudged defendant’s speed, his pulling out into the intersection was not grossly negligent and was reasonably foreseeable. Under the circumstances, a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant’s driving was both the factual and proximate cause of the accident, and that the victim’s act was not a superseding, intervening cause.”

The court, thus, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish a factual causation and proximate causation with respect to the charge of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing death.

Click here to read the entire opinion.

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The GL Law Group, PLC provides free information on Michigan DUI law and guide to choosing a good Michigan DUI attorney. If you have recently been arrested for a DUI, it’s important to contact a good DUI lawyer soon. A guilty DUI conviction can ruin your life. Contact us to set up a free DUI case review with a recommended DUI lawyer.

On October 4, 2007, in the DUI case People v. Cullen, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court’s decision to sentence the DUI defendant, who plead guilty to operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor — his third OWI offense (M.C.L. 257.625(9)(c)) — to three years of probation, with 60 days to be served in jail that was “subject to review.”

The prosecution appealed the trial court’s sentencing, arguing that imposing a 60-day jail sentence “subject to review,” meant that the court would consider at a later date whether it would require the defendant to serve the jail
sentence. The prosecution argued that this essentially imposed a suspended sentence in violation of M.C.L. 625(9)(d), and the Michigan Court of Appeals agreed.

According to the court of appeals, Section 625(9)(c) offers two alternate, but mandatory minimum sentences, either of which can be imposed. However, by making the 60 days of jail time “subject to review,” the court ruled that it essentially equaled that of a suspended sentence:

“Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines ’suspended sentence’ as a sentence that is ‘postponed so that the defendant is not required to serve time unless he or she commits another crime or violates some other courtimposed condition.’ In other words, the defendant is not required to serve the sentence at the time it is imposed. Thus, a suspended sentence is one that is imposed by the court, which the defendant may or may not be required to serve at a later date even though, as a practical matter, the defendant usually is not required to serve the sentence.”

Consequently, the court of appeals found the trial court’s sentencing to be invalid and remanded it back to the trial court for setencing again in accordance to M.C.L. 625(9)(c).

Click here to read the entire opinion.

On September 18, 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in the case People v. Maclean, upholding a jury conviction for operating while intoxicated and causing death. One of the defendant’s principal arguments on appeal was the trial court erred by allowing admission of the blood alcohol test result, claiming there was insufficient testimony regarding the chain of custody.

The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion allowing the blood alcohol test results:

“At trial, the nurse testified that she drew defendant’s blood upon his arrival at the hospital, pursuant to a doctor’s orders. The blood went into a vacuum-sealed tube, which she labeled and sent to the laboratory for analysis. The medical technologist testified that, according to her analysis, defendant’s blood alcohol level was .28. The results of the blood alcohol test were then admitted into evidence. Defense counsel cross-examined both witnesses regarding their involvement in the collection and testing of defendant’s blood, and, during closing argument, highlighted the deficiencies in the chain of evidence. The record arguably supported a conclusion that the chain of evidence was somewhat deficient regarding the manner in which defendant’s blood sample arrived at the laboratory for testing. However, no evidence was presented, and defendant does not argue, that the blood actually tested did not belong to defendant. Moreover, given the comparable result in the unchallenged police blood-alcohol test, the accuracy of the hospital blood-alcohol test is evident. Any deficiency in the chain of custody or evidence goes toward the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the report containing defendant’s blood alcohol level.”

Click here to read the entire opinion.

On September 18, 2007, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in the case People v. Waldeck, upholding a jury conviction for operating while intoxicated. The defendant was sentenced by the trial court to probation for two years and 183 days to serve in jail. This was the defendant’s third offense.

“Defendant’s conviction arises from a traffic accident that occurred on October 30, 2003. The principal question at trial was whether defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The prosecutor contended that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, but defendant asserted that the alcohol in his system was consumed shortly after the accident occurred.”

“A store clerk was the only witness who encountered defendant before defendant claimed to have consumed alcohol after the accident in order to control his breathing. While the clerk testified that he did not notice anything unusual in defendant’s demeanor or smell the odor of intoxicants, he also stated that he had only a brief conversation with defendant and did not pay close attention to him. Defendant appears to contend that because the other witnesses who encountered him after the accident also did not notice anything unusual in his demeanor or smell the odor of intoxicants, Officer Prough was either mistaken or lying. However, one witness testified that he was too far away to form an opinion about whether defendant was intoxicated, Elbert Sylvester had lost his sense of smell, and his wife stated that she was not really paying attention to defendant. Officer Prough noticed the odor and determined that it came from defendant. He stated that defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and, after having defendant perform several field sobriety tests, concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The jury was able to view a police video of defendant’s interaction with Officer Prough and performance during the sobriety tests. Defendant’s blood alcohol content was .09 approximately one hour after the accident. Defendant testified regarding his version of events.”

Click here to read the entire opinion.